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The Fisher–Neyman–Pearson theory of hypothe-
sis testing was a triumph of mathematical elegance
and practical utility. It was never designed, though,
to handle 10,000 tests at once, and one can see con-
temporary statisticians struggling to develop theo-
ries appropriate to our new scientific environment.
This paper is part of that effort: starting from just
the two-groups model (2.1), it aims to show Bayesian
and frequentist ideas merging into a practical frame-
work for large-scale simultaneous testing.
False discovery rates, Benjamini and Hochberg’s
influential contribution to modern statistical theory,
is the main methodology featured in the paper, but I
really was not trying to sell any specific technology
as the final word. In fact, the discussants offer an
attractive menu of alternatives. It is still early in the
large-scale hypothesis testing story, and I expect,
and hope for, major developments in both theory
and practice.
The central issue, as Carl Morris makes clear, is
the combination of information from a collection of
more or less similar sources, for example from the
expression levels of different genes in a microarray
study. Crucial questions revolve around the compa-
rability and relevance of the various sources, as well
as the proper choice of a null distribution. Technical
issues such as the exact control of Type I errors are
important as well, but, in my opinion, have played
too big a role in the microarray literature. The dis-
cussions today are an appealing mixture of technical
facility and big-picture thinking. They are substan-
tial essays in their own right, and I will be able to
respond here to only a few of the issues raised.
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I once wrote, about the jackknife, that good sim-
ple ideas are our most precious intellectual commod-
ity. False discovery rates fall into that elite category.
The two-groups model is used here to unearth the
Bayesian roots of Benjamini and Hochberg’s origi-
nally frequentist construction. In a Bayesian frame-
work it is natural to focus on local false discovery
rates, fdr(z), rather than the original tail area ver-
sion Fdr(z). My apologies to Professor Benjamini for
seeming to suggest that fdr is more immune than
Fdr to correlations between the z-values. All false
discovery rates are basically ratios of expectations,
and as such remain relatively unbiased in the face
of correlation. It is only the proof of the exact Fdr
control property that involves some form of inde-
pendence.
In the same spirit, I have to disagree that Fdr
produces more reproducible results than fdr. Both
methods operate at the mercy of an experiment’s
power, and low-power situations, such as the prostate
cancer study, are certain to produce highly variable
lists of “significant” cases. (At this point, let me re-
peat my plea for a better term than “significant”
for the cases found to be nonnull, a dubious nomen-
clature even in classical settings, and definitely mis-
leading for large-scale testing.)
As suggested by Figure 2, there is no great concep-
tual difference between fdr and Fdr, nor have I found
much difference in applications. Table 1 says some-
thing about their comparative estimation accuracy.
As Professor Cai suggests, the statistician can com-
bine the two, using Fdr to select a reportable list of
nonnull candidates, and fdr to differentiate the level
of certainty within the list. Here the two roles reflect
Benjamini’s distinction between decision theory and
inference, that is, between making a firm choice of
nonnull cases and providing an estimate of just how
nonnull they are.
As an enthusiastic collector of reasons to distrust
the theoretical null distribution, I am happy to add
preselection of cases to the list. Professor Benjamini
correctly points out the dangers of this practice—
among other things, it deprives the statistician of
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crucial evidence about the null distribution. If ques-
tioning the theoretical null seems heretical, it is worth
remembering similar questions arising in classical
ANOVA applications, for instance whether to use
σ2 (error) or σ2 (interaction) in assessing the main
effects of a two-way table. I share Benjamini’s pref-
erence for finding the “right” theoretical null, but
that is the counsel of perfection, often unattainable
in examples like the education data.
Questions of exchangeability play a key role in
large-scale hypothesis testing, as emphasized in Pro-
fessor Morris’s nice essay. The answer to “Which
problems should be tested together?” is not always
“All the ones the investigator put on my desk.” A
paper written after this article, “Simultaneous in-
ference: When should hypothesis testing problems
be combined?” (Efron, 2008) attacks this problem
without conquering it. As Morris points out, covari-
ates like school size in the education example may
undercut exchangeability—the nonnull z-values for
larger schools might lie farther away from 0. My pa-
per suggests how to incorporate covariates into an
efficient fdr analysis.
In this paper, only the paragraph following that
of (3.10) has anything to say about exchangeabil-
ity. (Notice that the local fdr puts less strain on
exchangeability than tail-area Fdr since only the
cases near some particular value z are considered
together.) For the education example we might be
willing to accept exchangeability for the null zi’s,
from simple binomial calculations, though not for
the nonnull cases. The interpretation of the equiva-
lent of “2.68/17” in the paragraph following (3.10)
could thus be modified in a Bayesian way to assign
greater nonnull probability to the larger schools.
Morris’ Section 3 is especially pertinent. His for-
mula for p(µ|z) is related to my discussion of the
Benjamini–Yekutieli False Coverage Rate method in
Section 7, particularly (7.2)–(7.4). Originally I had
hoped to develop an empirical Bayes method for es-
timating such models, but the effort foundered on
practical difficulties involving the perils of deconvo-
lution.
Section 6 on the “one-group model” is the ugly
duckling of the current paper, but it bears on some
important points raised in the discussion. Figure 7
concerns a fuzzy version of simultaneous hypothesis
testing, where, as in Morris’ hospital example, the
usual single-point null hypotheses seem unequal to
the task. The development from (6.6) onwards, par-
ticularly (6.12), bears on the possibility of nonnor-
mal null distributions, and is about as far as I can
go in answering Professors Rice and Spiegelhalter’s
penultimate question.
With g(µ) a normal distribution, model (6.1) re-
turns us to the realm of Stein estimation, the scene
of my happy collaborations with Carl Morris. I con-
tinue to be surprised at how much harder bumpy,
nonnormal models like (7.1) are to deal with. James–
Stein estimation works fine with, say, N = 10 com-
ponent problems, while the Robbins’ form of empir-
ical Bayes appropriate to (7.1) seems to require hun-
dreds or thousands. The information calculations
in Efron (2008) reinforce this gloomy assessment.
Maybe I am trying to be overly nonparametric in
constructing the empirical Bayes Fdr estimates, but
it is hard to imagine a generally satisfactory para-
metric formulation for (6.1). Or perhaps it is just
that hypothesis testing is more demanding than es-
timation.
Rice and Spiegelhalter propose an attractive al-
gorithm: rather than modeling the marginal den-
sity f(z) as in (3.6), they suggest directly model-
ing fdr(z). The resulting Huber form for f(z) has a
pleasant appearance, and I was relieved to see their
results agreeing with mine.
The Rice–Spiegelhalter model involves only two
free parameters, ka and kb, as opposed to seven in
(3.6). I doubt that two will be enough to cover a
general range of applications, but would be happy to
be proved wrong. For example, it might sometimes
be necessary to have different exponential rates of
decay in the two tails, rather than forcing them to
be the same. [Perhaps I am just trying to lob the
“ad hoc” accusation back into Rice and Spiegelhal-
ter’s court. Equations (3.4)–(3.6) describe a stan-
dard Poisson regression model; users of locfdr can se-
lect the degree of the regression, seven being only the
default.] In any case, the direct modeling of fdr(z)
is a promising new route of attack.
“Efficiency” in Professor Cai’s essay is what I called
“power” in Section 3, a somewhat neglected aspect
of multiple testing that now seems to be attracting
attention. My diagnostic E f̂dr(1), (3.9), is trying to
estimate the power parameter
1−
∫
fnr(z) · f1(z)dz,
where fnr(z) is the “local false nondiscovery rate”
1− fdr(z), to use Cai’s terminology. See Efron (2007).
Usually f̂dr(z) declines monotonically as we move
away from z = 0 in either direction, so that in each
tail f̂dr(zi) orders evidence against the null in the
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same way as the p-value, pi. The ordering can be
different, however, if we try to compare evidence
across the two tails. Cai’s results, with Sun, show
that it is better to define the decision boundary in
terms of fdr-values than p-values, for example by
f̂dr(zi)≤ 0.2 rather than using a p-value cutoff. This
nicely reinforces the utility of the Bayesian quantity
fdr(z) (2.7) for frequentist decision-theoretic calcu-
lations.
Jin and Cai have a quite different method for em-
pirical null estimation, based on Fourier analysis.
This moves in the opposite direction from Rice and
Spiegelhalter, more nonparametric rather than less,
and again seems to give good estimates.
Large-scale statistical inference blurs the line be-
tween Bayesians and frequentists: Bayesian informa-
tion accumulates, and cannot be ignored, but the
accumulation itself favors the use of frequentist tac-
tics. The definition of “empirical Bayes,” if there
is one, lies somewhere in the realm of Bayesian–
frequentist cooperation. Morris points out that this
broad-sense definition of empirical Bayes was too
wide for Robbins, and maybe for him too, but it is
probably enough for the methodological goals of this
paper.
My thanks go to the discussants, and also to the
editor Ed George for organizing a session on this
lively topic.
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